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Abstract: 
This paper explores the role of international actors in post-communist transformation. By 
taking the case of hospital design standards, it explains how the national actors choose to 
leave aside the national regulations and to adopt foreign technical standards. The paper takes 
the case of technical standards employed for the modernization of healthcare facilities in 
Ukraine and Moldova. An in-depth comparative case study of two projects revealed that 
national architects of these post-soviet countries use foreign standards. While the change of 
standards is a similar outcome in both cases, the international actors involved are different. 
My findings suggest that while both international organizations and private actors diffuse 
foreign technical standards in post-soviet countries, the processes through which they realize 
it differs. Whereas international organizations dispose of coercive means to impose foreign 
solutions, private actors need to negotiate and to convince for their adoption. Drawing on 
recent debates on policy diffusion and transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh 2012; 2000, Simmons 
and al. 2008, Stone 2010, 2012), the results shed light on “carriers” of institutional 
arrangements among different political systems. 
Key words: transfer, standards, international actors, post-soviet states 
  
                                                 
1
 Paper presented at the international conference in political science APSA, Chicago, United States, 2013. 
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Introduction 
This paper explores the role of international actors in post-soviet countries modernization, by 
taking the case of hospital design in Ukraine and Moldova between 1991 and 2011
2
. By late 
2000, both Ukraine and Moldova started to modernize the inherited hospital buildings, while 
aiming to adopt international standards
3
. We question the role of foreign actors, such as 
private firms and international organizations that participated at hospital building 
reconstruction in these post-soviet countries.  
The post-soviet states, such as Ukraine and Moldova, represent a stimulating research object 
for the study of policy transfer. Given the fact that these states did not join the European 
Union yet, their institutional developments following the Soviet Union’s collapse could be 
influenced by multiple and various foreign actors
4
. Taking a concrete case of public policy 
such as the modernization of healthcare facilities, we analyze the roles of international 
organizations and of private actors in transferring the foreign experience of hospital design. 
We focus on the strategies developed by the foreign actors to introduce the international 
experience in these post-soviet states, as well as on their interactions with the national actors 
and institutions.  
Our main hypothesis is that international organizations have more pressure means than the 
private firms to introduce the foreign experience, thus using of more coercive transfer 
mechanisms. 
In order to study the role of international actors in post-soviet states, we draw on the literature 
on policy transfer. We adopt the definition of transfer of David P. Dolowitz and David Marsh: 
“the process by which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions 
and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in the development of policies, 
administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system”5. Additionally, 
we use the terms of coercion and learning, based on the diffusion mechanisms developed by 
                                                 
2
 The paper presents one of the results of our PhD study on the “International transfers and institutional changes 
in post-soviet states: the case of building hospital standards evolution in Ukraine and in Moldova (1991-2011)” 
prepared at the Institute of Political Studies of Grenoble, France. 
3
 We do not detail in this article the content of the international standards, but notice that it concerns the 
recommendations of foreign actors of what is the « appropriate » practice, procedure and way of doing for an 
activity domain. The standards are to be differentiated of social norms (relative to the human behavior) or of 
regulations (formal documents with obligatory character), for more details refer to Brunsson, Nils et al., dir. A 
world of standards. New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2000).  
4
 In a main article on Europeanization and institutional transfer, Sabine Saurugger and Yves Surel point to the 
fact that what usually is analyzed under the conceptual framework of Europeanization (member states or even 
potential ones) should seriously take into account the multiple possible external influences: Saurugger, Sabine et 
Yves Surel, «L'élargissement de l'Union européenne : un processus de transfert institutionnel ?», Introduction 
13, no. 2 (2006), 177-8. 
5
 Dolowitz, David P. et David Marsh, «Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in Contemporary 
Policy-Making», Governance 13, no. 1 (2000), 5-23., p.5. 
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Beth Simmons and al
6
. If coercion it the mechanism through which a more powerful external 
actor influence domestic changes, learning takes place in a less asymmetrical relation. 
According to Katharina Füglister, learning can be defined as the process through which 
national actors use the foreign countries experience
7
. These conceptual markers will be used 
to characterize the degree of international actors’ influence in Ukraine and Moldova. 
The actors participating at transfer process can be very various
8
: states, international 
organizations, non-governmental organizations, civil servants, consultants, etc. In line with 
the latest work on non-state actors of Diane Stone
9
, this paper seeks to detail the role of 
international organizations, such as the World Bank, as well as of private firms, such as 
architecture and engineering design practices. If usually the action of international 
organizations is analyzed as coercive, through the economic and political conditionality, we 
seek to detail its role by focusing on the technical assistance provided to post-soviet 
countries
10
. In Moldova, the World Bank not only granted credit resources for the 
modernization of healthcare facilities, but also supervised its implementation and provided 
technical assistance to national actors. We question how the participation of World Bank 
consultants to the healthcare development in Moldova influenced the adoption of international 
standards of design. In Ukraine, we detail the role of economic actors, such as private firms, 
in transferring the hospital design standards of their countries. If the transfer literature omits 
the influence of this type of actors, we argue that their role should be more systematically 
analyzed. As shows our Ukrainian case, the private firms can be “carriers” of international 
standards: while realizing different economic missions, they develop strategies of “selling” 
their foreign experience to post-soviet states. 
This paper is structured in three sections. First, we introduce the analyzed projects. In 
Ukraine, the wife of former President Viktor Yoshchenko and the Foundation Ukraine 3000 
realized the main hospital modernization since the Soviet Union’s collapse. This project 
gathered numerous national and international actors. We focus on the foreign private firms 
that were appointed to the design of the Ukrainian hospital. In Moldova, we present the case 
of the modernization of primary healthcare facilities – the Health Centers. This project was 
chosen because it is the only modernization of public medical building realized following the 
                                                 
6
 We adopt the diffusion mechanisms in order to complete the conceptual framework on transfer, which does not 
detail the latter so successfully : Simmons, Beth A. et al., The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
7
 Füglister, Katharina, «Where does learning take place? The role of intergovernmental cooperation in policy 
diffusion», European Journal of Political Research 51, no. 3 (2012), 316-49., p. 319. 
8
 See for example the state of the art of the transfer literature and particularly the role of various actors in 
Delpeuch, Thierry, «L'analyse des transferts internationaux de politiques publiques : un état de l'art», Questions 
de recherche, no. 27 (2008). 
99
 Diane Stone particularly focused on the role of foundations, non-governmental organizations, think-tanks in 
the process of international transfers: Stone, Diane, «Non-Governmental Policy Transfer: The Strategies of 
Independent Policy Institutes», Governance 13, no. 1 (2000), 45-70, Stone, Diane, «Private philanthropy or 
policy transfer? The transnational norms of the Open Society Institute», Policy & Politics 38, no. 2 (2010), 269-
87. 
1010
 On the different types of influence of international organizations, see Nay, Oliver, «How Do Policy Ideas 
Spread among International Administrations? Policy Entrepreneurs and Bureaucratic Influence in the UN 
Response to AIDS», Journal of Public Policy 32, no. 1 (2012), 53-76. 
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independence and because of the participation of the World Bank. The second section 
questions the reasons of international actors to introduce their experience in post-soviet states, 
while pointing to the obstacle to this process. Given the fact that both Ukraine and Moldova 
experience more than fifty years of soviet background, we question the presence of similar 
institutional arrangements, such as the building regulations, to the international transfer. 
Finally, the third section introduces the mechanisms through which the World Bank in 
Moldova and the private firms in Ukraine convinced the national actors to adopt foreign 
design standards. 
In comparing two projects of healthcare modernization, we used data from our PhD research. 
In Ukraine, we observed the “making-of” of the Kiev hospital within the French private 
practice Groupe-6 during a three-year doctoral collaboration. In Moldova, we realized a two 
months internship at the Ministry of Health and collected data on several modernization 
projects. Additionally, we realized 93 interviews with architects, engineers, consultants, civil 
servants and officials from Ukraine, Moldova, France and the United Kingdom, some of 
which will be mentioned. 
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I ) How do international actors participate to hospital projects in post-
soviet states? The case of an international organization in Moldova 
and a private firm in Ukraine 
The first decade following the independence of Ukraine and Moldova saw no significant 
investment in the hospital sector, as other points of the health care system (the primary sector 
and the health insurance) were considered more essential
11
. The only hospital concern was 
linked to the reduction of healthcare facilities oversupply. During the Soviet Union, both 
republics had a large number of hospital beds, which exceeded the local population needs. 
Following the independence, both reduced the number of hospitals
12
. Nevertheless, despite 
the infrastructure reduction, hospital buildings remained those inherited of the Soviet Union. 
No resources were invested in remodeling the health care buildings neither of primary sector 
(medical centers), nor of secondary or tertiary sector (hospitals). 
By the end of 2000, both Ukraine and Moldova started modest investments in modernizing 
the inherited infrastructures. The dilapidated nature of inherited health care facilities started to 
become a problem of public interest. Despite the fact that the number of hospitals was 
reduced following the independence, the ones in place functioned within extremely poor 
conditions. The same applied to primary health care facilities, such as polyclinics. A World 
Health Organization report on Ukraine mentions for example that “Ten per cent of the 
physician respondents reported having no or insufficient access to X-ray facilities. Around 
half of the patients surveyed were dissatisfied with the premises and a large majority (74%) 
indicated that their policlinic or ambulatory had insufficient equipment”13. Besides the lack of 
medical equipment, there was also a lack of medical technologies which strengthened the 
problem of realizing complex surgical interventions. The ministries of health of both countries 
had to reorient patients for more complex treatment in healthcare facilities abroad
14
. There 
was a lack of modern medical equipment and technologies, as well as appropriate 
infrastructures for it, at the national level. It is in this context, that Ukraine and Moldova 
launched, by the end of 2000, several modernizations of old health infrastructures. In Ukraine, 
it was part of a Presidential initiative, under the direction of Viktor Youshchenko’s wife 
association. In Moldova, it followed a national program of healthcare system reform, 
sustained by international organizations and especially, by the World Bank. Political leaders 
of both post-soviet republics declared the willingness to integrate international standards in 
the new hospital buildings. 
                                                 
11
 This can be explained by the fact that during the Soviet Union, the primary sector was slightly developed, so it 
got the first attention on the public agenda. See for example the very well documented reports of the European 
Observatory of the World Health Organization (Euro WHO) for Ukraine and Moldova: Lekhan, Valery  et al., 
Ukraine: Health system review, ed. European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies. Copenhagen: Euro 
WHO, 2010).; Atun, Rifat et al., Moldova: health system review (dans Health Systems in Transition, ed. The 
European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies: Euro WHO, 2008). 
12
 As mentions a recent Euro WHO report on Moldova, there is still an oversupply of hospital beds in the country 
and especially in the capital Chisinau, Turcanu, Ghenadie  et al., Republic of Moldova: Health system review, ed. 
the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies. Copenhagen: Euro WHO, 2012)., p. XVIII. 
13
 Lekhan, Valeria et al., Health care systems in transition: Ukraine (Copenhagen: WHO Regional Office for 
Europe on behalf of the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2004)., p. 18. 
14
 Observation collected during our research internship in Ukraine and Moldova, March-May 2010.  
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A) The Children Hospital of the Future, in Kiev, Ukraine 
In 2006, the Foundation Ukraine 3000, run by President’s wife Kateryna Youshchenko15, 
started a national tour of healthcare facilities. The first lady reports of deplorable conditions of 
hospitals, especially for children, gave birth to the idea of the Hospital of the Future – a new 
modern facility, created upon the international standards, providing the latest medical 
equipment and technologies. The idea of creating the new hospital facility met the national 
health care priorities for treating the cancer disease of mother and children of Ukraine, for 
which the level was very high. The Foundation Ukraine 3000 presented the project to the 
President of Ukraine and to the Ministry of Health. The national leaders discussed the 
Foundation’s project together with the possibilities of restructuring one of the existent 
hospitals in Kiev. The construction of a new hospital – the Children Hospital of the Future – 
was retained. The political will was to create a completely new medical institution, different 
of inherited hospital buildings and modeling the best hospital practices of Western countries 
(in terms of medical equipment and technologies, as well as making of complex surgical 
interventions). On May 2006, the Ukrainian President Viktor Youschenko edited a Decree 
launching the project of the Hospital of the Future of Kiev. The Foundation Ukraine 3000 was 
missioned to realize the architectural design stage of the project, while the Ukrainian state had 
to realize the following stage – its construction.   
The project of the Children Hospital of the Future, in Kiev, engaged a large amount of 
national resources. The Foundation Ukraine 3000 launched a national fund collection among 
Ukrainian citizens, businessmen and members of Diaspora. As their representatives used to 
say, it was the first time that such a charitable operation was realized in Ukraine and that it 
benefited of the support of the whole country, including political members of different sides 
of the fence. In parallel to the fund collect, the Foundation representatives visited hospital 
facilities abroad. The aim of these actions was double: on one hand, the Foundation collected 
funds from the Diaspora and on the other hand, gathered information on the hospital 
developments of Western countries (visits were made in the United States, Canada, United 
Kingdom, Germany etc.). During these foreign experiences, the Foundation representatives 
who were to be invested in realizing the Children Hospital of the Future, became familiar with 
the hospital functioning, the hospital design as well as the medical procedures of western 
medical facilities. There was the clear idea of realizing in Ukraine a hospital institution on the 
image of the most advanced hospitals of the developed countries. 
Following the fund collect, the Foundation Ukraine 3000 launched an international design 
competition in order to attract foreign architects for the realization of the Children Hospital of 
the Future. The Ukrainian leaders considered that national architects would not know to 
design a hospital the way could the foreign ones. Even if they insisted on the fact that it was 
an open competition and that Ukrainian firms could participate, they highlighted the fact that 
they did not want a new hospital at the image of the inherited buildings. The fact that the 
Foundation made a list of foreign firms specialized in hospital design and contacted them 
                                                 
15
 The Foundation Ukraine 3000 was previously run by the President Viktor Youshchentko himself. While the 
latter developed more cultural action, in particularly in favor of recognizing the Ukrainian famine “golodomor”, 
Kateryna Youshchenko put emphasis on development of the health care sector. 
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directly to invite in the competition is another argument to the willingness to attract foreign 
experience of hospital design en Ukraine. A final stage between three firms (English, Italian 
and Ukrainian) declared, in June 2006, the Anglo-French consortium “bdpgroupe6” the future 
architects of the Hospital of the Future. The foreign architects were chosen by a jury of 
national members (Foundation members, Ukrainian architects, entrepreneurs…) and 
international representatives (architects and doctors from abroad). Bdpgroupe6 was chosen on 
the basis of a project design sketch, which included a preview image of the future hospital. 
This point started a three-year collaboration started between the national actors – Foundation 
Ukraine 3000 – and the international actors – bdpgroupe6 – for the hospital design of the 
Children Hospital of the Future, in Kiev. 
B) The primary health care centers in Moldova 
The modernization of Centers of primary healthcare
16
 in Moldova was part of a broader 
Strategy of Development of the Primary Assistance, put in place by the Ministry of Health. In 
2007, the ministry elaborated a feasibility study concerning the current estate of the primary 
sector
17
. The study made the inventory of all existing medical institutions, the technical 
conditions of the buildings, the equipments and the medical personnel. It was revealed that the 
existing centers did not respond to optimal conditions for functioning as medical institutions: 
80% of them did not have canalization system and water (only from the well); 49% were built 
before 1980; 80% did not dispose of medical equipment and furniture
18
. Following these 
conclusions, the Ministry of Health promoted several proposals to the Government of 
Moldova, especially concerning the attractiveness of medical staff in the rural areas. In the 
same time, international organizations joined the initiated national actions in the primary 
sector. The financial aid was provided by several international organizations. There was the 
World Bank Program “Health care Services and Social Assistance” (about 5 million dollars to 
the medical assistance in rural areas), but also the financial support of the European Union 
through the TACIS program “The support of healthcare reform. The consolidation of primary 
medical assistance in Moldova” (for which 4.5 million dollars were attributed). Among these 
different foreign actors, we chose to analyze the involvement of the World Bank. The latter’s 
support concerned more specifically the modernization of the buildings, while that of the 
European Union was related to the purchase of medical equipment. Thus, the concern for the 
building remodeling allows the comparison with the construction of a new hospital building in 
Ukraine. 
                                                 
16
 The Health Centers (or the Centers of primary healthcare) are, in Republic of Moldova, medical institutions in 
rural areas. These are small buildings, with laboratory equipment, transportation and department of family 
doctor. Ministry of Health of Republic of Moldova. 2003. Order of the Ministry of Health regarding the 
institution of the health structure of region/municipality/ Ordin al Ministerului sanatatii cu privire la instituirea 
structurii sistemului sănătăţii raionale/municipale. 190. 
17
 This document was prepared with the  support of the Japanese Government aid grant, Ministry of Health of 
Republic of Moldova, Report of activity of Miistry of Health for the year 2007/Raport de activitate a 
Ministerului Sanatatii pentru anul 2007. Chisinau, Moldova, 2008)., p.26. 
18
 Ibid.  
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The World Bank support for the primary sector in Moldova was part of a more extensive 
Program of Assistance to the Moldavian Government. The latter obtained a World Bank 
credit of 17 million dollars for the project “Health care and social assistance services” 
(HSAS) in June 2007. The funds aimed to sustain the Government Program of increasing the 
health care services and social assistance to the Moldavian population. This national project 
was implemented during 2007 and 2011 by two central administrations: the Ministry of 
Health and the Ministry of the social protection and of the family. Within this very large 
program of assistance, a piece was dedicated to the primary health sector in order to 
strengthen the actions started by the Ministry of Health in this field
19
.   
To get into details, the Ministry of Health received a credit of about five million dollars from 
the World Bank, under the component “1.3 – The development of primary medical 
assistance”20. Although one of the program components concerned the hospital sector and the 
modernization of a main hospital of the country
21
, we chose to analyze an example of 
modernization of primary health care facility because this sector was more developed. As 
reports the General Accounting Office of Moldova, by 2010, the component of primary 
medical assistance was realized up to 70% of the sum credited by the World Bank, while the 
hospital component was scarcely attaining 20% of the used resources
22
. In this context, the 
modernization of primary facilities is more advanced in Moldova than the modernization of 
hospitals, which was at its beginnings. The observation of a concrete and finalized project of 
medical building modernization allows questioning more precisely the role of the World Bank 
in the introduction of international standards. 
The project of the modernization of primary care facilities in rural areas concerned the 
reconstruction of some of existing ones and the construction of new Centers where necessary. 
This involved not only the improvement of building conditions, but also the provision of 
advanced medical equipment and technologies. We stress here the fact that according to the 
new medical equipment, the healthcare centers were also supposed to change their 
architectural layouts. Because of the changing dimensions of new medical equipments, the 
areas and the disposal of modernized centers were supposed to be modified (this point will be 
developed later on). Therefore, the modernization of primary care buildings was linked to the 
provision of new and more advanced equipments (with new technical characteristics, sizes 
etc.). 
                                                 
19
 The HSAS project contained four main axes: 1) health care services; 2) improvement of the system of 
protection and social assistance; 3) management of the project; 4) healthcare and nutrition status protection. The 
first point – the “health care services” – was implemented by the Ministry of Health and concerned various 
aspects (from the development of the medical assistance to evaluating hospital capacity and their modernization). 
20
 General Accounting Office of the Republic of Moldova, Audit Report of the project "Healthcare and Social 
Assistance Services" for the period 2007-2010/ Raportul auditului operațional al Proiectului „Servicii de 
Sănătate şi Asistenţă Socială” pentru perioada iunie 2007- 2010. Chisinau, Moldova: Curtea de conturi a 
Republicii Moldova, 2011). 
21
 The Clinical Republican Hospital was part of a project of building restructuring within the World Bank 
program, but it is not taken for our present analysis, because it still ongoing while we are writing the article. 
Although the comparison with Ukrainian case would have been more precise (two hospital projects), there is not 
for the moment any other project of modernization of medical facility in Moldova realized with the World Bank 
support, apart the Centers of primary assistance in rural areas. 
22
 General Accounting Office of the Republic of Moldova,  op. cit., p. 5. 
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It can be concluded that at the difference of the Ukrainian project of the Children Hospital of 
the Future, the re/construction of the Centers of primary healthcare in Moldova was launched 
with the financial support of the World Bank. Besides, there was no international selected 
firm for this project. Only local companies were appointed for remodeling the existing 
facilities or constructing new ones
23
. Another difference between the cases concerns the 
expressed willingness to adopt international standards of building design. The Moldavian 
Ministry of Health did not express the introduction of international standards while 
re/building the primary Centers
24
, compared to Ukrainian Foundation who insisted on the 
creation of a hospital based on the design experience of advanced countries. In addition, 
Ukrainian leaders made an international tour in order to inspire themselves of the most 
advanced developments in hospital design, but also medical equipment and technologies that 
were used by western hospitals.  
Regarding a process of transfer of hospital design standards, it can be observed that in the 
Ukrainian project, national actors have started evaluating hospitals abroad. In the same time, 
they did not put in place a concrete working document of the specific western hospital 
characteristics to be adopted in Ukraine. At this early stage of the project, the visits abroad 
can be considered as a beginning of learning. National actors want to see in their own country 
a hospital at the image of those of western countries because they consider them to be 
efficient, because they see how they function, the advanced equipments and technologies they 
have, as well as the health care services they provide. From this point of view, the process of 
importing the foreign experience can be characterized of learning, where national actors 
inform themselves and evaluate the foreign solution before importing them. It can be 
differentiated of emulation, where the national actors would want to have a western hospital 
without knowing its characteristics and only knowing that this is “the trend” in current 
hospital development. It also can be observed that international actors were not present 
neither in Ukraine, nor in Moldova, during these early stages. The World Bank in Moldova 
credited resources for the project of CPH, but this went along with the Government previous 
initiatives of developing the primary sector. This is even more visible in Ukraine, where 
international firms integrated the hospital project only by the moment of the design 
competition. Consequently, the launch of healthcare modernization facilities in Ukraine and in 
Moldova was realized at the initiative of national actors. If in Ukraine, political leaders 
engaged in a process of learning in order to adopt hospital design developments of Western 
countries, in Moldova, there was apparently no particular will of observing the primary 
healthcare facilities of other countries. The presence, in both cases, of international actors 
                                                 
23
 The absence of international design firms for the Moldavian project can be explained by the fact that the 
financial resources were less important (around 800 000 dollars for a Center reconstruction in Moldova, 120 
million dollars construction cost of the Ukrainian hospital). Second, while in Ukraine the operation concerned 
the construction of a new hospital, the modernization of Centers in Moldova was essentially reconstruction, 
which can be less motivating in terms of design for international firms. 
24
 It should, however, be mentioned here that the Ministry of Health stated the respect of “international 
technological standards” for the medical services provided in the Centers of primary assistance. Nevertheless, 
this point concerned the type of service provided (primary care, different of secondary care provided in hospitals, 
related with the population reached as well as the competence of medical personnel, all of which were more or 
less neglected during the Soviet Union) and not the standards of building design,  Ministry of Health of Republic 
of Moldova,  op. cit., p. 30. 
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during the next phases of the project, allows investigating their influence on an eventual 
transfer of foreign experience. 
In sum, we will question the role of international actors in Ukraine and Moldova through the 
analysis of two different cases: a hospital project construction in Ukraine versus a primary 
care re/construction project in Moldova. In the same time, both projects concern the 
modernization of healthcare facilities (primary care in Moldova and tertiary care (hospital) in 
Ukraine). International actors are present in both projects, although they are different 
organizations: private firms in Ukraine and international organization in Moldova (Table 1). 
We will now turn to the way these two different actors engaged in a transfer of design 
standards in order to details the similar or different characteristics of this process. 
 
Table 1: International and national actors of the two projects
25
 
 
Cases UKRAINE MOLDOVA 
Project Children Hospital of the future 
Primary care Centers in 
rural areas 
National actors 
(public investors) 
Foundation of wife’s President Ministry of Health 
International 
actors 
Anglo-French design firm “bdpgroupe6” World Bank 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
25
 The actors named in the table are reduced for the purpose of the article. There are several other national, as 
well as international actors of these projects, but which were not retained for our present study. Our aim is to 
focus on these types of actors in order to observe if their different nature (international organization and 
international design firms) produced different forms of transfer of standards in the health sector modernization of 
Ukraine and Moldova. 
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II ) The international actors as “carriers” of foreign hospital design 
standards 
In this second part of the article, we present how the international actors participated at 
introducing the foreign experience of designing a healthcare facility. If the Anglo-French 
consortium bdpgroupe6 was called in Ukraine to design a hospital upon their international 
experience, no such demand was presented to the World Bank in Moldova. Yet, in both cases, 
the foreign actors insisted for adopting the international standards of building a facility, while 
deviating from national regulations of these countries. We explain here the reasons of this 
position. 
A) The international actors face to the national regulations of post-soviet countries 
The mission of international actors in the Ukrainian and Moldavian projects was different. In 
Ukraine, bdpgroupe6 had to develop the design of the Children Hospital of the Future. In 
Moldova, the World Bank participated with financial resources and did not realize the 
re/construction of the primary Centers, for which local companies were appointed. In the 
same time, because of the credited resources, the international organization had an eye on the 
proceedings of the project. So the foreign actors intervened in both cases, although within 
different missions and at different moments. 
As previously mentioned, the Foundation Ukraine 3000 selected the Anglo-French 
consortium bdpgroupe6 for designing the Children Hospital of the Future. The organization 
clearly expressed the willingness to obtain a hospital design upon the international 
experience
26
. In the same time, following the competition, the Foundation required the respect 
of national Ukrainian building regulations by international consultants. This concerned the 
obtaining of certificates from the national administrative authorities and especially the 
building permit
27
. The fear of the Ukrainians was to get a foreign piece of hospital design that 
would not be approved by local authorities and that they would not be able to build in 
practice. For this, the Foundation asked the foreign architects to introduce a local partner in 
their team. In addition, it stipulated in the contract the obligation of obtaining the building 
permit: if bdpgroupe6 did not obtain it, they would not receive one large part of their 
payment. 
If bdpgroupe6 integrated a local company
28
 – the Ukrainian architects from Budova Centre-1 
– in its team, it did not accepted so easily to conform to Ukrainian regulations. Before signing 
the contract with the Foundation, the consortium questioned the impact of Ukrainian 
regulations on their mission. Given the fact that Ukraine was a post-soviet country, they 
wanted to know if its national building regulations would not constitute an obstacle for 
implementing their hospital design experience. First, the foreign architects started to inform 
                                                 
26
 This was specified in the mission’s document provided to bdpgroupe6, consulted by the author. 
27
 In Ukraine, the building permit is delivered by a national commission called “Expertyza” which checks upon 
the design project conformity with the national Ukrainian regulations before emitting its authorization. 
28
 The Anglo-French firm bdpgroupe6 initially composed of several foreign companies: Groupe-6, architecture 
French company, BDP, British engineering company and EC Harris, British building consultancy company. 
Later, bdpgroupe6 was joined by Budova Centre-1, Ukrainian architecture company.  
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about the Ukrainian technical norms. They got the documents of the Ukrainian norms and 
tried to translate them. This task proved to be very tedious. It rapidly became obvious that 
studying the Ukrainian regulations will be complicated, because of their very large number, as 
well as because of their specificity
29
. Second, bdpgroupe6 asked advice from the local 
architect Budova
30
. The latter explained that respecting the Ukrainian regulations meant to 
completely reevaluate the foreign design proposal. Budova made clear that the future hospital 
would not look like the sketch design proposed at the competition, but like an ordinary 
Ukrainian hospital: 
“The Client (the Foundation) wants an European design hospital. In the same time, they want 
the Ukrainian regulations be applied. This is non-sense. The Ukrainian norms we have are 
those of the soviet period. If I apply them, I completely change the design of bdpgroupe6 and 
that they presented at the international competition. I can do this, but is really a lot of work. 
The project needs to be redesigned”31.  
Following the consultations with local architect and taking also into account the visual 
differences between hospitals of Ukraine and those of their own countries, the foreign 
architect estimated that respecting the national building norms of Ukraine did not allow them 
to maintain their hospital design. Additionally, this would have reduced their architectural 
mission to the profit of the local architect, who would strongly adapt it to the Ukrainian 
design characteristics.  
The incompatibility of foreign hospital design with the Ukrainian regulations created a 
conflict between the Foundation Ukraine 3000 and the international consortium bdpgroupe6. 
The two parts handled negotiations during several months before signing the contract. Thus, 
even if bdpgroupe6 was selected by July 2007, the contract for the designing the Children 
Hospital of the Future was only signed by December 2007. Both sides opposed on the subject 
of Ukrainian building norms respect. The Foundation did not want a project design which 
would not be accepted in Ukraine and thus put the clause of obtaining the building permit 
from the authorities as a contractual obligation. In the same time, the Foundation wanted the 
foreign architects to present a hospital design upon their international experience. Their 
members insisted on the fact that foreign architects need to design the Kiev hospital on the 
image of the most advanced medical institutions of their countries (France, United 
Kingdom…). In response, bdpgroupe6 explained that implementing their experience while 
respecting the Ukrainian regulations would be impossible. The foreign firms wanted to obtain 
the permission of working more freely if putting in practice their experience. Their motivation 
was linked both to economic reasons (more important fees than the local architect) and 
                                                 
29
 The Ukrainian regulations were a large corpus of documents based on the regulations of the USSR and which 
were written in a specific vocabulary, that even translated, still was difficult to understand for foreign architects. 
30
 During our PhD study we assisted as the most part of the discussions between the foreign and Ukrainian 
participants at this project. 
31
 Author’s interview with the Ukrainian Architect Director of Budova Centre-1. Additionally, during our 
discussion with other design firms in Ukraine in May 2010, the director of one of them recognized they refused 
the partnership with bdpgroupe6 because of the very main differences of the project and the existing hospitals in 
Ukraine and also, their building national regulations. 
13 
 
symbolic ones (keep their initial design and avoid seeing a “soviet hospital” with their name 
on it
32
). 
Also for economic reasons, the World Bank in Moldova opposed to modernizing primary 
Centers upon the national building regulations. But the context of this opposition was 
different of the Ukrainian case. In the Moldavian project there was initially no particular 
concern for the international standards of design or the international experience of foreign 
consultants, as only national design firms were appointed. In the same time, the new Health 
Centers that had to be redesigned upon new architectural layouts and new healthcare needs 
that the ministry considered following developments during the post-soviet decades. During 
the Soviet Union, the primary medical assistance was provided essentially in policlinics or 
rural Medical Points. Policlinics were larger and Medical Points smaller than the Health 
Centers the Ministry of Health wanted to build in 2007. In addition, during the soviet period, 
the characteristics of the healthcare facilities (medical points, policlinics or hospitals) were 
decided by the Ministry of Health of the USRR upon the principles of the soviet healthcare 
system Semashko
33
. This time, the central Moldavian authority could estimate the 
characteristics of the desired healthcare facility, depending on the number of population of the 
region, the medical staff and the healthcare services provided. 
The characteristics of the re/construction of primary Centers in Moldova were agreed with the 
World Bank’s representatives, according to the credit’s conditions. Put simply, the 
international organization supervised the implementation of the credit. For this, the Ministry 
of Health had permanent discussions with the World Bank. The organization had local 
consultants within the ministry who worked with the civil servants on the project
34
. This way, 
the characteristics of each Health Center, their repartition on the territory as well as their 
number were agreed with the World Bank. As one of organization’s consultants explained 
while informing about the usual procedure of contracts realized with the World Bank support: 
“The World Bank has specialists in all the areas and especially in medicine. And the person 
who is specialized in medical insurance can look also on the contract mission and tell: “here 
you need to complete”, “here you need to take out” etc. So, there are comments from the 
World Bank. Sometimes, if there are critical moments, even if they do not have a specialist on 
that question, they invite one”35. 
According to contractual mission of Health Centers’ reconstruction, 65 Health Centers were 
supposed to be modernized within the Bank’s credit. It is upon this mission that the Ministry 
                                                 
32
 Author’s observation during discussions within bdpgroupe6 members. 
33
 Semashko was the name of the First Health Commissioner of the USSR who gave the name to the soviet 
healthcare system. Its main principles were: Health is a State priority; Health must be free for everyone; the 
Health Policy should be centralized and unified in USSR; the priority of the Health system is the preventive 
medicine etc. For more details, see Leichter, Howard M., A Comparative Approach to Policy Analysis: Health 
Care Policy in Four Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 326., p. 211. 
34
 By “local consultant” of the World Bank we mean local specialists who were appointed by the organization to 
assist the Ministry of Health on the project involvement. As we saw during our internship at the Ministry, they 
were usually civil servants of the Ministry who for a year or two were paid by the World Bank to work on their 
projects and who could return therefore within the ministry. 
35
 Author’s interview with World Bank consultant, Ministry of Health of Moldova, Chisinau, Moldova, March 
2010. 
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of Health selected local architectural companies. Until this moment of the project, we can see 
that the World Bank did not intervene directly in the content of the contractual mission with 
the local companies. Although it discussed with the Ministry the characteristics of the future 
healthcare facilities, there were no objections and no demand of respecting some international 
standards. However, it should be noted here that the conditions of the new Health Centers 
elaborated by the Ministry of Health were different from the medical institutions of the Soviet 
Union. In particular, the size of it was reduced, as well as the services provided. As explains a 
member of the project within the Ministry, the Health Centers were in the past District 
hospital, with some more medical services than the rural Medical Points and considerably less 
than a regional hospital. Following the independence, some of these former hospitals were 
closed and some other were redesigned under the Health Centers project: 
“I would say that this process evolved until 2001 when more than 250 district hospitals were 
closed. In fact, these institutions, with maximum from 50 to 100 beds, without surgical bloc, 
there were only some easy surgical operations, in fact, were not profitable at all. So the 
medical services provided, their cost was so low that it was impossible to maintain this 
hospital with an administration, with doctors, with nurses, with all that infrastructure 
inherited from the Soviet Union…”36. 
The difference between the new dimensions of the Health Centers and those of the medical 
institutions of the soviet period was the starting point of debates between the local actors and 
the World Bank. Even if the contractual mission specified more reduced layouts, the 
Moldavian design firms point to the fact that the national building regulations did not allow 
them to design all the elements wanted by the Ministry of Health. In particular, some of the 
rules obliged them to respect the characteristics of a medical facility specific to the soviet 
period. In result, the Health Centers were much more expansive than the cost estimations 
made initially by the Ministry of Health and agreed with World Bank. It appeared that in 
order to respect Moldavian regulations, only 35 Health Centers could be modernized and not 
65 as initially planned. In this context, the World Bank expressed its opposition: the 
organization did not want to reconstruct fewer Centers than it would have been possible with 
the credited resources.  
If in Ukraine, foreign architects were attached to their design proposal, as well as to their 
financial fees in opposing to the respect of Ukrainian regulations, the World Bank opposed for 
economic reasons as well. In the same time, it was not about making profit, as in the case of 
private firms in Ukraine, but for not using irrationally the granted resources. Both Ukrainian 
and Moldavian cases also points to the fact that neither the Ministry of Health, not the World 
Bank, was initially aware of the problem of building regulations in Moldova. Similarly to the 
Ukrainian case, the problem of incompatibility between the new needs in healthcare sector 
and the building national regulations appeared following the evolutions within the first of the 
two sectors. But why were the national building regulations of these post-soviet countries a 
problem for modernizing the healthcare facilities? 
 
                                                 
36
 Author’s interview with civil servant at the Ministry of Health of Moldova, Chisinau, Moldova, March 2010. 
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B) Are the Ukrainian and Moldavian building regulations a problem for 
introducing the foreign experience 
During the USSR, Ukraine and Moldova had much of the same public policies. These were 
political orientations developed by central organs of the Soviet Union and implemented 
through public policy instruments
37
. The design and building of healthcare facilities was at the 
center of the health policy and of the policy of construction. The soviet central ministries of 
Health and of Construction decided of the number of hospitals to be built on the territory of 
each republic, of the health services to be provided, on the characteristics of the healthcare 
facilities. For example, one political line was the large number of hospitals, which explains 
that both Ukraine and Moldova (as well as number of other former soviet countries) inherited 
of an exceeding number of hospital beds following their independence. If the health policy 
concerned the development of medical institutions and their function, the policy of 
construction structured the construction of medical buildings. All soviet republics shared 
common characteristics of construction buildings, starting with the building regulations of this 
activity and ending with the use of construction materials. A central organ of USSR – the 
Gosstroy
38
 – elaborated the main policy orientations and the policy tools which were followed 
by each soviet republic. Among the various policy instruments, the building regulations were 
one of the largest in the area of the construction of healthcare facilities. During the Soviet 
Union, both Ukrainian and Moldavian national actors (authorities, architects and engineers) 
used the same soviet building regulations – called SNIP39 and GOST40 – for the construction 
and modernization of hospitals, policlinics, medical points etc. 
If the collapse of the USSR meant the ending of the soviet political and economic system, this 
did not apply to all of its institutions. As Claus Offe and Jon Elster put it, there was no tabula 
rasa following the independence of the post-soviet countries and the change produced in these 
countries were rather progressive than immediate
41
. In the absence of new institutional 
arrangements, both Ukraine and Moldova saved the inherited ones. The case of the building 
regulations is an example of this king of institutional continuity. Given the fact that these 
technical norms regulate the activity of construction and that the national ministries did not 
elaborate new ones, both Ukraine and Moldova adopted following the independence the 
soviet building regulations as national ones. As the majority of architects and civil servants 
interviewed during our investigation confirmed, the soviet SNIP and GOST were re-adopted 
under different titles after 1991 (DBN for Ukraine and NCM for Moldova). Nevertheless, 
except their name, the content remains the same. 
                                                 
37
 We adopt the definition of Pierre Lascoumes and Patrick Le Galès of a public policy instrument: “a device that 
is both technical and social, that organizes speciﬁc social relations between the state and those it is addressed to, 
according to the representations and meanings it carries”, in Lascoumes, Pierre et Patrick Le Galès, 
«Introduction: Understanding Public Policy through Its Instruments—From the Nature of Instruments to the 
Sociology of Public Policy Instrumentation», Governance 20, no. 1 (2007), 1–21., p.4.  
38
 The Gosstroy was an executive organ (an Executive State Committee) in charge of elaborating the main policy 
lines of the building construction in USSR (and which were adopted by the national ministries of each republic). 
39
 The soviet SNIP (in Russian “sanitarnyie normi i pravila”) represent the building technical regulations of the 
USSR. 
40
 The GOST (in Russian « gossudarstvenyie standarti ») represent the building technical standards of the USSR. 
41
 Elster, Jon et al., Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
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If the continuity of building regulations under the soviet form during the first decade could be 
linked to the lack of any national document, it is subject of more intense discussions twenty 
years after the Soviet collapse. Our research points to the absence of major reform in both 
post-soviet states concerning the building regulations
42
. The question of the transformation of 
the inherited technical norms is raised by the architects and engineers of these countries, who 
in order to introduce new equipments, technologies and building materials, point to the need 
of reforming the institutional framework. As they explain, the soviet building regulations 
were very detailed and stipulated precisely the size, the layout, the equipments and the 
materials that a healthcare facility should contain. Given the fact that many of these 
parameters evolved together with the evolution of the science and technology, the inherited 
norms need to be revised
43
. Thus, when the national actors of the health sector started the 
modernization of healthcare facilities, the national building regulations were an obstacle to 
this process, both in Ukraine and in Moldova
44
.  
III ) How did the international actors manage to implement their 
foreign experience of hospital design? 
How did the international actors modernize the healthcare facilities of Ukraine and Moldova 
if the national building regulations of these countries were an obstacle to it? As shows the 
case of the Children Hospital of the Future in Kiev and the re/construction of Health Centers 
in Moldova, foreign actors opposed to respecting the national regulations which intended to 
modify the architectural solutions they suggested. Even if quite different, both had economic 
reasons to insist on introducing the international experience. Our hypothesis was that given 
the difference of status and action capacity if these actors, they did not apply the same 
measures to convince the national actors of introducing the foreign experience. We supposed 
the World Bank had more power to impose its will than the private companies in Ukraine. 
Thus, the transfer of foreign design standards should be more direct and top-down than in the 
case of private firms. 
A) The negotiated transfer of private firms 
The detailed analysis of the case of Kiev hospital showed that foreign consortium bdpgroupe6 
took a long time to negotiate with local actors the implementation of its model of hospital 
design. This point was crucial during the beginning of the project and especially for the 
contract signature, but also during the design works. The Foundation Ukraine 3000 signed the 
contract five months following the international competition. If bdpgroupe6 obtained not to 
entirely respect the national Ukrainian regulations, it still had to obtain the authorities 
certificates before receiving the payment of the mission. In the same time, the financial 
representatives of bdpgroupe6 managed to negotiate the support of the Foundation for the 
                                                 
42
 Attempts to reform the inherited regulations were announced several times since 2000, both in Ukraine and in 
Moldova, but no transformation was performed until presently, in particularly concerning the design of 
healthcare facilities. 
43
 Author’s interviews with Ukrainian and Moldavian architects and engineers. 
44
 We do not develop here the reasons of the continuity of building regulations in Ukraine and in Moldova 
twenty years following their independence, but notice that this is linked to the absence of clear political agenda 
as well as of the lack of national resources.  
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introduction of foreign design solutions during the project. Following the initial conflict on 
the building regulations, the Foundation accepted to help the private firms in introducing their 
experience in Ukraine. In particularly, the organization addressed the problem of foreign 
design incompatibility with national regulations to the President Viktor Youshchenko, who 
called national ministries (of Health, of Construction, of Environment) to work on the 
implementation of the project. Additionally, the hospital project obtained the Experimental 
Status in Ukraine, which allowed deviating from national regulations, while producing a 
convincing justification. These national actions comforted the Foundation in supporting the 
introduction of foreign hospital design. It also stresses the fact that the only willingness of 
introducing the international experience without the political support of the President would 
have not suffice to pursue the project against the national regulations. The Foundation had 
intense debates with the foreign architects on the respect of Ukrainian building norms and 
signed the contract only when it obtained the presidential political support. 
The Kiev project also points to the ability of international firms to negotiate for the adoption 
of their design solutions. Bdpgroupe6 had no means to make pressure on signing the contract 
with the Foundation. As we observed, the four months of signature expectation put the foreign 
firms under tension. They advanced resources for the international competition (the sketch 
design preparing) as well as for the initial stages following it (the starting of design plans, the 
visits of the site in Ukraine etc.). If the Foundation did not sign the contract, bdpgroupe6 
would have lost the initial investments in the project, without any refund. So they insisted on 
keeping the original design and deviating from some Ukrainian regulations in discussions 
with the Foundation, but without disposing of coercive means. In this context, the strategy of 
the private practice was to convince the Foundation that she needs a modern advanced 
hospital and that Ukrainian regulations do not permit it; that only their international 
experience would provide a performing hospital on the image of those of Western countries; 
that they were aware of respecting the necessary regulations in Ukraine and of obtaining the 
authorities certificates, but in the same time, did not agree to transform their hospital design 
into a soviet one. The foreign private firms simply insisted on the “selling” of their 
“international hospital design” for which they were initially selected at the competition. They 
also took into account the fact that the Foundation had no interest to fail signing the contract, 
given the popularity and political image of this project in Ukraine. 
B) Coercion through World Bank technical assistance 
The World Bank in Moldova had different attitude in the Health Centers project. The 
international organization held a more strong discourse to the national actors than the foreign 
private firms in Ukraine did. In particular, the World Bank did not agree to pursue the project 
if its conditions were not to be respected. The Ministry of Health signed for a contractual 
mission of 65 Health Center modernizations and finally presented only 35 for effective 
realization, which could seem suspicious. Even if the national actors claimed that the number 
of modernization became lower according to the application of national building regulations, 
the international organization was attached to the rational management of granted resources. 
The World Bank insisted in recalculating the number of possible building modernization 
within the project. According to ministry’s representatives, its opposition to changing the 
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initial contractual mission was not to be discussed
45
. The international organization played 
thus the card of conditionality: the resources were credited under specific conditions, agreed 
by the both parts and the non-respect of these conditions could suspend the granted resources. 
As explained another project member, the World Bank granted a credit to the Government of 
Moldova and a problem with the Ministry of Health would had repercussion on the overall 
image of the country
46
. 
In order to recalculate the number of Health Centers to be modernized, the World Bank 
appealed to foreign architects. The latter estimated the dimensions and characteristics of the 
Centers to be build, as well as their cost, within the sum of the project. As pointed the national 
building specialists themselves
47
, the Moldavian national regulations, mostly inherited of the 
soviet period, constrained the construction of Centers to larger dimensions that the new 
equipments and technologies henceforward allowed. There was a difference of building cost 
between the estimations of foreign consultants appointed by the World Bank and the 
estimations of Moldavian architecture companies appointed for the project. Given the fact that 
the cost evaluations of international consultants allowed for a larger number of Health Centers 
re/constructions, the World Bank required for the Ministry of Health to keep their 
suggestions. 
At the difference of the Ukrainian case, in Moldova, the international organization did not put 
in place a negotiation strategy aiming to convince of the necessity to adopt the foreign 
experience. The Health Centers project shows that the World Bank has sufficient resources 
and pressure means to require the adoption of foreign solutions. Indeed, the Ministry of 
Health did not insisted on the necessity of respecting the national building regulations, as the 
Foundation Ukraine 3000 did. Instead, it adopted the design standards presented by the 
foreign architects appointed by the World Bank. Following this procedure, the Ministry of 
Health presented to the Ministry of Construction a demand of deviating from the national 
building regulations. At the difference of Ukraine, the Ministry did not wait for the approval 
or the support of national authorities or political representatives, before taking into account 
the foreign actor’s demand. Consequently, the relation between the national and international 
actors was different in analyzed cases, concerning the introduction of foreign design 
experience. Although, in both countries, national actors of the health sectors modernize the 
healthcare facilities with the support of international actors, the nature (coercive or 
negotiated) of the transfer of foreign experience varies depending on the resources of the 
later: more the foreign actors dispose of pressure means on national actors, more they can 
impose the deviation of national inherited regulations
48
. 
                                                 
45
 Author’s interview with a civil servant at the Ministry of Health of Moldova, in charge of the Health Centers 
project implementation, Chisinau, Moldova, April 2010. 
46
 Author’s interview with a civil servant at the Ministry of Health of Moldova, in charge of the Health Centers 
project implementation, Chisinau, Moldova, March 2010. 
47
 Author’s interview with a civil servant at the Ministry of Health of Moldova, in charge of the Health Centers 
project implementation, Chisinau, Moldova, April 2010. 
48
 This does not suppose that the result of the transfer is more positive in the case of coercive means. As we saw 
in the project of Health Centers in Moldova, the World Bank certainly made the Ministry of Health adopt the 
international standards for the contractual mission. Nevertheless, the international organization did not 
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Conclusion  
This article questioned the role of international actors, such as private firms and international 
organizations, in transferring the foreign experience in post-soviet states. It took the case of a 
concrete public policy domain – the modernization of healthcare facilities – in order to 
present the national and foreign actors involved, the transfer strategies deployed as well as the 
obstacles and catalyst to this process. The aim of the article was to detail the role of non-state 
actors as “carriers” of foreign standards, thus enlarging the debates on soft-forms of transfer. 
We initially argued that while both international organization and private firms introduce 
foreign standards of hospital design in Ukraine and Moldova, the mechanisms of transfer 
differ. Our hypothesis was that the World Bank in Moldavian project used of more coercive 
means to transfer foreign standards than the private firms in Ukraine. The detailed analysis of 
two modernization projects validates this hypothesis.  
The results of our research investigation show that in Moldova, the World Bank disposed of 
pressure means, especially through the technical assistance provided to national actors, to 
require the adoption of international standards. The organization engaged its own consultants 
in order to check upon the efficiency of the standards to be adopted in the Health Centers 
project and insisted in taking into account the foreign ones, as they allowed a more efficient 
use of the credited resources. The World Bank played the card of the conditionality of the 
granted financial resources in order to obtain the adoption of foreign standards.    
In Ukraine, the private firms we observed in the Kiev Children Hospital of the Future 
deployed a strategy of “selling” their international design. They tried to convince of the merits 
of the hospital design of Western countries and the necessity of deviating from the inherited 
building of the Soviet Union. In opposite to the international organization, the business firms 
did not possess coercive means to make the national actors accept the architectural solutions 
they proposed. Instead, they used of commercial strategies for convincing the national actors 
to adopt the foreign experience.  
In conclusion, we remark that international transfers took place in post-soviet states in the 
context of an initial local demand of foreign experience. International organizations, private 
practices and other non-state actors use various mechanisms (coercion, learning) to transfer 
their experience, therefore participating at institutional national changes. The elements 
presented in this paper stress the fact that both Ukraine and Moldova wanted to modernize the 
healthcare facilities inherited of the soviet period on the model of the western countries 
developments. The international actors that they call in to this process strengthen the initial 
national actions, inciting the Ukrainian and Moldavian officials of the health sector to urge the 
reform of the unchanged national building regulations. 
                                                                                                                                                        
supervised the project during its implementation and some Moldavian construction firms still used the national 
regulations, thus spending more than initially scheduled. 
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